Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93918 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 157
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is characterised by its focus on an informational structure which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' private value. The main result is to show that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed (ii) private beliefs about the relative precision of these signals sufficiently differ. We derive economic policy implications of such a result.
Schlagwörter: 
Speculative attack
Private value game
Multiple equilibria
Public and private information
JEL: 
F31
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
151.23 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.