Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98544 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2013 [Pages:] 339-346
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This paper studies a repeated play of a family of games by resource-constrained players. To economize on reasoning resources, the family of games is partitioned into subsets of games which players do not distinguish. An example is constructed to show that when games are played a finite number of times, partitioning of the game set according to a coarse exogenously given partition might introduce new symmetric equilibrium payoffs which Pareto dominate best equilibrium outcomes with distinguished games. Moreover, these new equilibrium payoffs are also immune to evolutionary pressure at the partition selection stage.
Subjects: 
evolutionary stability
repeated games
bounded rationality
analogies
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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