Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/198837 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7477
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
What are the incentives for governments to coordinate their policies internationally when there is model disagreement and uncertainty? We build a model where countries disagree on policy targets and how policies affect the economies, and show that uncertainty not only determines the type of cooperative policy but also whether countries want to cooperate at all. Countries facing larger model disagreement also need to face larger uncertainty with respect to policy spillovers to agree on cooperation. Thus, uncertainty on spillovers can be a substitute for model agreement.
Schlagwörter: 
policy coordination
uncertainty
ideological commitment
model disagreement
JEL: 
F42
F53
F55
F68
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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