Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286835 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Evolutionary Economics [ISSN:] 1432-1386 [Volume:] 31 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1277-1290
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also populations of volunteering types. Monomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the populations have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such monomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the population becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large.
Subjects: 
Volunteering
Stochastic stability
Finite populations
Mixed strategies
JEL: 
C73
D62
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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