Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295799 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16776
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Many cities with school choice programs employ algorithms to determine which applicants get seats in oversubscribed schools. This study explores whether the New Orleans placement algorithm favored students of certain races or socioeconomic classes via its use of priorities such as geographic and sibling priority. We find that when Black and White applicants submitted the same first-choice request for kindergarten, Black applicants were 9 percentage points less likely to receive it, while students in poverty were 6 percentage points less likely to receive a first-choice placement than their peers. We examine these priorities and simulate placements under alternate policies.
Subjects: 
school choice
algorithm
equity
access
JEL: 
I24
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
659.8 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.