Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298804 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 308
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms.
Subjects: 
Auditability
Allocation Mechanisms
JEL: 
D47
D80
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.