Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300149 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1194
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We propose a new model of mixed oligopoly where a workers' cooperative firms competes with a number of profit maximising companies. Building upon a large empirical evidence, we innovate as compared to the traditional literature on the objective function of the cooperative; moreover, its membership is treated as endogenous in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We show which factors may be responsible of the degeneration of the workers' cooperative firms, which occurs when the number of members shrinks with respect to the overall employees.
Subjects: 
cooperatives
mixed oligopoly
degeneration
JEL: 
L21
L25
P13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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